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Ab s t r A c t
The aim of this article is to revisit the work of the French philosopher 
Julia Kristeva and ask what place we might give her conceptual framework 
today. I will focus on one key aspect of Kristeva’s work, sexual difference, 
as that which ties most, if not all, aspects of Kristeva’s work. I am hoping 
to present a concise, yet wide-ranging view on Kristeva’s critical contri-
bution to the fields of politics and ethics. My objective will be threefold. 
First, I will present the main lines of Kristeva’s theory on sexual diffe-
rence; this presentation will also outline her political critique of equal-
ity and diversity in the domains of gender and sexuality. Kristeva believes 
that contemporary politics invested in suppressing inequality through the 
promotion of diversity will in the long term not only prove unsuccessful, 
but also create more exclusion. Secondly, I will point out the main objec-
tions raised against her theories and show how her critics come to their 
conclusions. Objectors to Kristeva’s sexual difference theory are mostly 
concerned with the manner in which she associates marginality and unin-
telligibility. They see little value in her theory, because, on the one hand, 
it relegates marginal groups to a world beyond social viability, and, on the 
other, because it effectively disables advancements in equality politics. Fi-
nally, I hope to provide the reader with a useful counter-critique to Kris-
teva’s detractors that will show why their views are partly founded on 
a misreading of her ethical (Freudian) framework and a desire to translate 
her work into a more pragmatic and user-friendly tool. I will argue that 
Kristeva’s work is best apprehended as a variant of psychoanalytic ethics 
and that to engage with its rhetoric is to capture the full weight of Kris-
teva’s contribution to politics and intellectual engagement. 
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tIntroductIonThe objective of this article is to revisit the work of the French philoso-pher Julia Kristeva and ask what place we might give her conceptual frame-work today. Kristeva’s work has often left critics with ambivalent feelings towards her work. She first made her mark on the Anglo-American aca-
demic world in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the introduction of 
her symbolic/semiotic modalities of language. Some saw in the semiotic 
“disposition” of the speaking subject (Revolution in Poetic Language) the 
potential for emancipation from hegemonic (symbolic) forces. However, 
when Kristeva herself objected that it was not what she meant (Tales of 
Love 80–81), she also found herself the target of criticisms. The semiotic 
“disposition” of the subject lacked the potential for actualization and Kris-
teva was accused of siding with the enemy in relegating the possibility 
of an emancipated “semiotized” individual to the fate of unintelligibility 
(Doane and Hodges 76).
Indeed, the lack of intelligibility would become a recurring complaint 
made against Kristeva in the 1980s and 1990s. Her work was seen as un-
necessarily “hard-core” intellectualism, out of the reach of the uninitiated, 
too abstract; in short, too removed from lived social experiences. Kristeva 
herself summed up her position in academic circles:
I believe that much of what has been written in the United States about 
my conception has been inaccurate. People have either defined and glori-
fied the “semiotic” as if it were a female essence or else claimed that I do 
not grant enough autonomy to this “essence.” (qtd. in Guberman 269)
The vision of Kristeva’s work as neither here nor there also provoked 
a third type of criticism. There is both a wish and a difficulty in labelling 
her work and tying her to a  school of thought. This is particularly ob-
vious when critics attempt to by-pass Kristeva’s allegiance to the Freud-
ian framework. Trying to explain what Kristeva is proposing away from 
psychoanalysis has led many critics to volunteer other labels to describe 
where Kristeva’s work might belong: French feminism and French theory 
for example are amongst the most commonly found, especially in Anglo-
American feminist circles. Attempts to sever Kristeva’s work from Freud-
ian legacy raise questions about academic allegiance: on the one hand, Kris-
teva’s own allegiance to established frameworks (I will come back to this) 
and on the other her critics’. The need to reposition Kristeva’s work says 
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more about those critics’ need to contain and appropriate what Kristeva 
represents for them than what her work actually achieves. While such ap-
propriation opens the door to misreadings of Kristevan theory, it has also 
had an interesting effect on feminist debates. The Anglo-American impor-
tation and packaging of Kristeva’s work under the “French feminist” ban-
ner has refreshed discussions in Anglo-American feminism regarding the 
place of otherness (cf. Gambaudo, “French Feminism vs. Anglo-American 
Feminism: A Reconstruction”). In a context (the 1970s/80s) where femi-
nism was grappling with the very stuff that justified its existence (women’s 
essence, their political rights, etc.), the coining of “French feminism” al-
lowed Anglo-American feminists to regroup around more philosophical 
questions of inclusion, exclusion, marginality, foreignness, etc. It also 
enabled some to dissent against so-called “French theory” because of its 
insistence on the importance of “otherness.” As Lechte explained, French 
theorists (especially those of a Freudian persuasion) are regarded as suspi-
cious because they make central to their thesis the matter of “otherness,” 
a  term that an empirical and pragmatic Anglo-Saxon academic tradition 
deems too elusive to conceptualize (25). Both sides were thus asking per-
tinent questions to the other: on the pragmatic side, for example, what 
status shall we give this “other”? How do we incorporate the “other” in 
political (feminist) demands? On the “French” feminist side, the assimi-
lation of otherness as “diversity” in political rhetoric was seen as a short 
term solution. If otherness provokes the exclusion of some individuals, 
motivates projective identification, triggers one’s hatred of strangers and 
in the extreme prompts psychotic acting-outs against fellow beings, then 
its metamorphosis into issues of “diversity” is questionable. Worse, Kris-
teva suggests that it may also be what participates in “othering the other” 
further. This is what this paper is interested in. Before we begin unpacking 
the relationship between otherness and diversity, I want to make one final 
point of introduction to address the previously opened question of Kris-
teva’s academic allegiance, or lack thereof.
Kristeva would be too intellectual and too Freudian. The attempts to 
separate her work from its Freudian roots lead to questions regarding her 
true academic commitment, at worse to accusations that she lacks aca-
demic purity. These critics do have a point. Pegging Kristeva’s work with 
labels is indeed a challenge. Even within psychoanalysis, her work is in-
debted to many schools: Freudian, Lacanian, Kleinian and Object Relation 
Theory, to name just a few. Psychoanalyst, philosopher, feminist, linguist, 
novelist, political theorist, sociologist and critical theorist are some of the 
terms most commonly used to describe who Kristeva is. Indeed, her in-
terdisciplinary approach is forcing her work into the margin of scholarly 
disciplines. In an interview, she said: “I’m at the interface of disciplines. 
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This is still perceived by the French university or media establishment as 
something that is, if not scandalous, at least disturbing” (qtd. in Lechte 
and Margaroni 156). She then added that her status as a foreigner had also 
been a  hindrance in gaining academic validation amongst French intel-
lectuals. While this is true in France, Kristeva’s status as a foreigner and 
her work on otherness has been precisely what has attracted such a huge 
 interest, whether positive or negative, outside France, especially in the 
United States. But as she says, in France her work tends to be relegated 
into a certain margin of thought because her foreignness and her interdis-
ciplinarity disturb the academic establishment. The fact that Kristeva links 
the two ideas together in Lechte’s interview is significant. While she does 
not explicitly come to any conclusion regarding hostility towards interdis-
ciplinarity and distrust of foreignness, there is little doubt that she is talk-
ing about the same thing: hegemonic hostility towards “bastardization” of 
thought and “bastardization” of being. To be clear, in Kristeva’s work, the 
manner body and mind are signified points to the same issue, that of oth-
erness, of difference, or, more precisely, sexual difference. And any form of 
marginalization, for example dismissing interdisciplinarity as a lesser form 
of thought, or doubting someone’s conceptual frameworks because of its 
(and her) foreign character, are particular formations of a wider question 
regarding sexual difference.
This essay will be primarily concerned with “sexual difference,” one 
area where Kristeva has contributed the most, possibly the area as other 
key themes like otherness, foreignness, the maternal, feminism, etc., can 
be traced back to her sexual difference theory. In conjunction with sexual 
difference, I am interested in her response to more pragmatic approaches 
to difference, that is the integration of difference and its morphing into 
issues of diversity and equal opportunity in mainstream politics. Kristeva 
sees such equality rhetoric as attempts to level out difference. I  aim to 
show that Julia Kristeva’s conceptual framework is a valuable tool to evalu-
ate and critique cultural responses to social concerns today. I will begin 
with an appraisal of what Kristeva has contributed in the field of difference 
theory and gender discrimination. In a second stage, her framework will 
be pitched against political achievements that have granted “oppressed” 
minorities equal opportunity. We will see that behind some promotions of 
“diversity” can hide the loss of difference in the sense that Kristeva gives 
it. The trivialization of difference into euphoric messages, for example like 
those found on diversity posters, would not promote diversity but in fact 
participate in its repression. To illustrate this, I will look at one significant 
manifestation of it: sexuality. A recurring theme in the work of Kristeva, 
sexuality is where she unpacks the hidden face of hegemonic (hetero-) 
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sexuality, with surprising conclusions critiquing the demands of marginal-
ized sexualities (LGBT, for example) for claiming successful outcomes to 
activism. Her dedication to challenging hegemonic thought has motivated 
her to stick to her psychoanalytic “guns” rather than resort to what she 
sees as uncritical speedy fixes to social unrest (promoting “gay marriage,” 
for example). This essay will thus emphasize Kristeva’s more discreet form 
of subversion, one that has a crucial role to play in responding to social 
unrest and which is part of her ethical framework for a forward-thinking 
intellectual practice.
A PlAce In IntellectuAl HIstory: dIfference
The hinge pin of Kristeva’s framework is without question the issue of sex-
ual difference or differentiation. In fact, Kristeva occupies an interesting 
place in the theory of difference. In her essay “Women’s Time” (1979/1981), 
she famously uses three common historical moments of the feminist strug-
gle to explain key philosophical positions in feminism and clarify the am-
biguous relationship between feminism and sexual difference: first-wave 
feminism also known as “liberal” feminism, second-wave or “radical,” and 
third-wave or “postmodern/poststructuralist” feminism. The first wave, 
mostly concerned with issues of suffrage and education, directed their ef-
fort at difference to decry its injustice. First-wave feminism aimed to cor-
rect inequality between the sexes by denouncing difference as the source of 
women’s exclusion and seeking its eradication in particular fields of social 
experience, politics and education mostly. The second wave, politically, so-
ciologically and intellectually empowered by the achievement of the first 
one, again would locate feminist advancement in revisiting the notion of 
difference. But second-wave feminists saw the first-wave’s effort to eradi-
cate difference as a selling out of “woman” to dominant politics. Feminists 
now denounced the effort to reach equality as an assimilation of woman 
to “sameness” (meaning: to man) and as the cause of women’s servitude. 
Consequently, second-wave feminists directed their attention at ways of re-
habilitating difference as source of woman’s identity. For example, the crea-
tion of Virago Press in 1973 sought to promote female writers whose work 
had not yet been published or had been neglected or fallen into oblivion. 
The legacy of the first and second waves of feminists is unmistakable. 
Today, equal opportunity policies or the right to diversity are omnipresent 
markers of feminist achievements. While Kristeva nods to these undeni-
able triumphs of feminism, she also critiques what she perceives as the 
shortcomings of identity politics. John Lechte summarized those short-
comings as follows: 
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A failure by first generation feminism (for example de Beauvoir) to rec-
ognize the risk of being incorporated into the male power structure, and, 
with the second generation, a blindness as to the risk of sectarianism 
and of becoming agents of the violence (terrorism) that the movement 
expressly opposes. (207)
For Kristeva, the problem with identity politics lies in the very act of 
speaking in the defence of “woman,” as feminism does. She has consist-
ently warned that to posit collective identity above the singularity of indi-
vidual experience is harmful. Kristeva does not mince her words and firmly 
believes that asserting the existence of sexual identity (the existence of 
men and women) is a form of tyranny imposed on the individual. If “wom-
an” (for example) is that which is equal to or different from man, sameness 
and difference then become the terms by which “woman” is normalized. 
By extension these are also the terms that deny “woman” the possibility of 
becoming anything else. “Woman” is then this universal figure that all girls 
aspire to grow into regardless of their background and that is actualized in 
the reiteration of what is “same as” or “marginal to” dominant narratives 
that describe her. 
With her 1979 (translated 1981) essay, Kristeva’s complaint announces 
the coming of age of identity politics, which flourished from the 1980s on-
wards and found their accomplishment in the work of scholars like Judith 
Butler. 
[T]he premature insistence on a stable subject of feminism, understood 
as a seamless category of women, inevitably generates multiple refusals 
to accept the category. These domains of exclusion reveal the coercive 
and regulatory consequences of that construction, even when the con-
struction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes. (Butler 6) 
By this Butler echoes Kristeva’s words: “I think that the apparent co-
herence which the term ‘woman’ assumes in contemporary ideology . . . 
essentially has the negative effect of effacing the differences among the di-
verse functions and structures that operate underneath this word” (“Wom-
en’s Time” 18). Noëlle McAfee summarized the risks of un-deconstructed 
acceptance of “woman’s difference” and of the forces that regulate the rep-
resentation of that difference. Whether idealized as a good wife/mother 
or demonized as a dangerous vixen, woman’s difference is romanticized 
to such a point that real women are denied individuality and specificity of 
identity (McAfee 100). Kristeva’s objection to identity politics is partly 
located here. She argues that romanticizing “woman” identifies “woman” 
with her perceived essence, constraining her to a pre-defined position of 
inferiority and marginality (qtd. in Guberman 116–17). Difference thus 
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becomes her and between idolization and vilification, “woman” loses her 
singularity in favour of other images that become particular formations of 
the woman spectrum: from the good woman (maternal, caring, etc.) to the 
bad woman (ranging from alluring to deadly). 
The construction of woman as same-as-man is equally unsatisfactory 
for women, but here Kristeva tells us that it is not just women who face the 
exclusion of their singularity. I will detour briefly via Luce Irigaray whose 
framework so aptly shows the dangers of so-called “sexual equality” for 
women. I will then return to Kristeva to draw attention to a critical aspect 
of her framework that could be summed up as follows: the conclusion 
drawn by detractors of identity politics is that the attempt to establish cat-
egories founded on sameness and/or difference amongst individuals would 
achieve the opposite. It would not lead to establishing satisfactory coher-
ent categories of being but instead participating in the undoing of those 
same categories. If identity politics amounts to the negation of individual 
identities in favour of coherent pre-set identity types, what is interest-
ing in Kristeva is that she is not advocating the end of difference. On the 
contrary, she proposes a  revisiting of difference theory (the process by 
which one draws differences amongst people) as the creative path towards 
individual singularity.
In 1974 Luce Irigaray published Speculum of the Other Woman. Her 
book became one of the key texts describing the risk of unquestioned ad-
herence to patriarchal models for women. In her thesis, Irigaray coins the 
notion of “phallogocentrism,” a  term with which she critiques two key 
traditional concepts: logocentrism and phallocentrism. Schutte describes 
logocentrism as the assumption that there exists a “transcendental subject 
of knowledge [who] coordinates and controls the multiplicity of sensations 
and impressions received from sense experience, thus forming a  unified 
field of experience” (65). The subject would moderate the transcendence 
of knowledge, which in turn operates as the referent of all representation. 
Hence, one’s linguistic experience is the site where what one says is truly 
what one means. With the term “phallocentrism” a  gender dimension is 
added. Phallocentrism is the attitude of one who assumes that epistemic 
experiences are valid inasmuch as the actor of the experience is male and 
that his experience is the referent for all experiences. Hence, experience is 
“fundamentally hermetic,” operating “according to rules and conventions” 
that exclude women (Irigaray, je, tu, nous 28). Any experience that is not 
phallocentric, that is any experience defined as that of woman, must be 
linguistically territorialized and made to comply “into the production of 
the same discourse” (Irigaray, Speculum 137). Irigaray is proposing that al-
though dimorphic by definition, there are no two gender identities (man/
woman) but one since men’s experience is the only one that counts.
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Most women’s experience tells them . . . that they are first and foremost 
asexual or neuter. . . . The difficulty they face in order to enter the be-
tween-men cultural world leads almost all of them, including those who 
call themselves feminists, to renounce their female identity and relation-
ships with other women, bringing them to an individual and collective 
impasse, when it comes to communication. (je, tu, nous 21) 
So what about women’s role in this phallogocentric arrangement? 
Women’s femininity becomes the object of men’s subjectivity and acts as 
catalysts to their experience. What Irigaray means is that “woman” is not 
anything except that which it needs to be in order to make man’s experience 
meaningful. She is his other, his variable: the unintelligible, the irrational, 
that which lacks something and is in need of his linguistic input if it is to 
achieve intelligibility and recognition.
“Phallogocentrism” is by and large what Kristeva is critiquing in first 
generation feminism and in today’s policies of equal opportunities. What 
she sees as the levelling of difference is similar to Irigaray’s idea of the 
neutering of women’s sex. For Kristeva, the recognition of one’s strange-
ness avoids the erasure of one’s difference. Yet celebrating diversity is not 
necessarily the same as recognizing one’s own strangeness because diver-
sity is politically recuperated in a narrative of difference that averages out 
everybody’s rights to a common denominator. The cultural expression of 
this common denominator comes down to a “doing” of diversity, to use 
Butlerian rhetoric, and becomes the means by which the individual signi-
fies their difference. Kristeva’s understanding of difference, however, is 
not about diversity awareness. Her theoretical framework is explicitly an-
chored in Freudian psychoanalysis and this means that difference is always 
mediated by the libido. So, instead of having difference as desexualized 
diversity awareness, on the contrary, difference is that which is libidinally 
invested and is manifested in the individual’s pleasure and creativity. Kris-
teva explains that 
if you level out difference, given that it’s difference that’s desirable 
and provokes sexual pleasure, you could see a  kind of sexual 
anesthesia. . . . That’s extremely troubling, first, for the individual’s 
psychic life whose levelling off rules out desire and pleasure, and 
second, for the individual’s creative possibilities. (qtd. in Guberman 
126–27)
In a phallus-centred organization of knowledge, the marker of difference 
(and so of pleasure and creativity) is the female body. The female body, in 
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particular the phenomenological female body,1 becomes that object which 
challenges and ultimately prevents the libidinal disinvestment of individu-
als of both sexes. Why prevent? Because its difference repositions it as this 
strange, elusive “thing” every time one attempts to appropriate it to turn 
into an “object.” The apprehension of the female body and of its experi-
ence is the marker of a desire for difference. This desire is manifested in 
practices which, although experienced as pleasurable, nevertheless always 
frustrate the individual by virtue of being outside phallogocentric experi-
ence. So returning to Irigaray and our critique of equality and diversity, 
under the guise of encouraging the singularity of individuals, political en-
gagement in fact levels these singularities to a common state of experience: 
the heterogeneous nature of difference, mediated by the libido, is neutral-
ized in favour of a single (phallogocentric) vision of knowledge. The expe-
rience of difference is lost in that process.
There is, however, a big difference between Irigaray and Kristeva. The 
latter does not advocate the re-writing of theories of sexual diffe rence to 
allow woman her own different sexual identity. On the contrary, Kristeva is 
more loyal to the traditional epistemic model than Irigaray. She advocates 
the maintenance of a phallocentric model for different reasons. One is an 
issue of stability. The overthrow of phallogocentrism would, she believes, 
lead society to the brink of psychosis and self-destruction. The creation of 
a labio-logocentric or gyno-logocentric, whatever morphological equiva-
lent to the phallus we might use, would not lead to the rehabilitation of 
woman’s epistemic experience, as would be hoped, simply because Kriste-
va does not believe there is such a coherent unit as man or woman already 
there and phenomenologically ready to share its experience. As a result, 
we cannot say that it is only women who must fight a system that excludes 
their singular experience. Men also face the risk of neutering in a phallogo-
centric system. This has important consequences for the understanding of 
Kristeva’ ethics as an intellectual and I will return to it later.
If Kristeva rejects the re-writing of difference theory to accommodate 
women, she does, however, come close to it with her symbolic/semiotic 
model of language. Caught between a romanticized image of woman and 
one that erases her, Kristeva proposed in 1979 that we should regard the 
categories “man” and “woman” as metaphysical. In doing so, she was in-
strumental in questioning the possibility of a coherent form of feminism. 
Instead of a monolithic understanding of feminism’s essence and objec-
tives, she advocates a form of feminism that promotes the philosophical 
questioning of identity and of its politics, and the aesthetic practice of her 
1 What Kristeva describes as “the feminine” and what I return to in the next section.
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version of “the feminine.” Before we move on to the terms that define “the 
semiotic feminine,” I want to emphasize the importance of aesthetics in 
Kristeva’s understanding of feminist engagement. Indeed, one of the cri-
tiques addressed to Kristeva’s vision of a third type of feminism is at times 
a misreading of and at others a disagreement with the wider potential of an 
aesthetic feminine practice. What I am saying is that a criticism regarding 
Kristeva’s alleged disengagement from hands-on politics could be criticism 
of a wider question about the powers and limits of aesthetic practice. In 
short, can aesthetic production change social reality? If so, which aesthetic 
practices should we favour? I am not proposing to answer these questions 
here but I am interested in showing how Kristeva’s aesthetic critique of 
sexual difference, although seemingly disconnected from, even hostile to 
the defence of “women,” is in fact a call for more subversive practice at the 
service of social change. In other words, as I will illustrate below, many of 
Kristeva’s aesthetic practices can be perceived as nothing more than cir-
cular bourgeois narratives that only serve the perpetuation of hegemonic 
thought. But the careful consideration of her psychoanalytic framework 
shows that the opposite is also true. 
sexuAlIty, HomosexuAlIty And tHe otHer of oedIPus
A critical reading of Kristeva’s oeuvre permits the construction of her theo-
ry of sexuality, or maybe more accurately theories of sexuality. In what fol-
lows, I am recalling conclusions I made in an earlier article (“Julia Kristeva, 
‘Woman’s Primary Homosexuality’ and Homophobia”) and using those 
to emphasize the importance of maintaining sexual difference in seeking 
subversion of hegemonic (hetero)sexual narratives. While arguing that in 
order to challenge hegemony one needs to maintain it sounds like a circu-
lar argument, Kristeva’s take on it should not be dismissed too quickly. For 
the past 20 years, her argument has been that the opposite of differential 
treatment of sexualities, for example seeking equal opportunity for lesbian 
and gay couples to marry, does not achieve the coveted acceptation of oth-
er sexualities but rather levels out these sexualities along heterosexual lines 
of understanding. This is not a new argument (see Kosofsky Sedgwick, for 
example). But a careful reading of Kristeva shows that she does something 
quite subtle and unusual that in my reading amounts to a form of sexuality 
theory that is new. This is what I want to describe now. 
Kristeva has famously proposed a model of language where two mo-
dalities, symbolic and semiotic (1974/1984), cohabitate within language 
and contribute to meaning-making. She has consistently and, in my 
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 opinion, very successfully applied this model to many areas of experience: 
gender, ethnicity, race and what interests us here, sexuality. Effectively, 
Kristeva challenged the Freudian model with her own. Freud proposed 
the Oedipal model as universally applicable to all individuals. Castration 
engenders individuals: men become men because they are threatened with 
gender emasculation (the fear to lose their phallus) and women become 
women because they seek gender reparation (the desire to recapture the 
lost phallus). 
Kristeva does not dispute this but slows down the Freudian model of 
sexual development and pauses on the part just after loss, when the phallus 
becomes the referent of sexuality. She suggests that while the symbolic fill-
ing of the hole may well be reparative, it is never complete. Furthermore, 
in the case of pregnancy, that filling may not be all it seemed to Freud. In 
fact, she believes pregnancy is subversive. Kristeva is particularly inter-
ested in the manner pregnancy is psychologized and fantasized, so in her 
work the pregnancy experience is not confined to parturient women, nor is 
it confined to females in general. More precisely, it is the fantasy of parthe-
nogenesis or immaculate conception where the individual can experience 
desire without symbolic castration. In other words, in fantasizing con-
ceiving immaculately, the individual imagines that s/he bypasses the prob-
lem of sexual difference and challenges the compulsion to heterosexuality. 
Pregnancy fantasies also portray a perfectly symbiotic relationship which, 
while being of the same body, is nevertheless a twosome that finds its foun-
dations and accomplishment in a sense of kinship (mother and child) that 
ignores the father’s involvement. Put differently again, Kristeva’s “Ma-
donna model” (cf. Gambaudo, “From Scopophilic Pleasure to the Jouis-
sance of the Madonna”) challenges heterosexuality and in the challenge 
to heterosexuality lies one of the definitions Kristeva gives of woman’s 
homosexuality2: the doubling of bodies and the search for female kinship 
away from castration (Le Génie Feminin III 351–52). I do not have the 
space to unpack the individual’s motivation for actually fabricating such 
fantasies and successfully preserving them in spite of repression. But there 
are three interesting points I want to highlight: first, once these fantasies 
are formed, they become a kind of blueprint for particular psychosexual 
formations, effectively cohabitating with fantasies of an Oedipal nature. 
So, we now have at least two psychosexual models, one symbolically mo-
tivated (Freud with castration) and one semiotically motivated (Kristeva 
with the Madonna model). Second, these fantasies appear in both men and 
2 To be accurate, she calls it woman’s primary homosexuality, but for simplicity, I am 
using the expression “woman’s homosexuality.” 
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women.3 I suggested somewhere else the possibility of Madonnic fantasies 
in men (“From Scopophilic Pleasure to the Jouissance of the Madonna” 
18). In one example, Dick Blau’s photographs of his wife (Jane Gallop) 
and child (Max), Blau ordered the mother and child, then engaged in the 
ritual intimacy of Max’s bath time, to look at him and he captured on 
camera the pair’s angry looks directed at the father’s intrusion upon their 
symbiosis. Blau, we are told, intentionally set up the angry response in 
his desire to chronicle photographically the rejection of castration. Third, 
although they bypass castration, Madonnic fantasies are intelligible only 
retroactively, after Oedipal development. Hence, women’s homosexuality 
is located somewhere between the two ends of a spectrum with at one end 
“the delightful arena of a neutralized, filtered libido, devoid of the erotic 
cutting edge of masculine sexuality” (Kristeva, Tales of Love 80–81) and at 
the other lesbianism is made intelligible through the prism of phallic desire 
(for example stone butches, lipstick lesbians or Diesel dykes become the 
colourful phallogocentric formations of lesbian intelligibility). 
Understanding Kristeva’s conceptual apprehension of woman’s ho-
mosexuality clearly matters in the context of lesbian studies and lesbian 
and gay rights. It also matters more widely. Talking about sexuality goes 
way beyond categorizing sexuality according to preference of sexual part-
ners. Rather, the analysis of the ontological structuring of sexuality has in-
teresting results for a challenge of hegemonic (hetero)sexuality. At the end 
of the analysis, Kristeva tells us two things: one that she remains on her 
position (dismissal) regarding the possibility of a socially coherent form 
of homosexual existence, in the sense she gives homosexuality. Whether 
hetero- or homosexual, all individuals seek intelligibility via an already es-
tablished form of sexuality and do so more or less successfully. In this, we 
can recall Irigaray who says there is only one true form of sex and sexuality 
and it is phallogocentric. When Kristeva is insisting that the phallus is the 
referent of any form of sexuality, she is by and large saying the same thing: 
“To the extent that she has a loving soul, a woman is drawn into the same 
dialectic involving confrontation with the Phallus. . . . Whatever the organ, 
confrontation with power remains” (Tales of Love 80–81). But Kristeva 
also tells us that at an aesthetic level much more can and should be done. 
A reassessment of ontological categories is not just desirable; it is a prac-
tice showing one’s sense of good intellectual ethics. Beyond the question 
of sexuality, Kristeva firmly believes that an aesthetic practice of marginal 
forms (narratives, paintings, etc., but also their analysis) is key to  resisting 
3 Although I have an un-investigated suspicion that their particular formations tend 
to differ along gender lines (see Gambaudo, “From Scopophilic Pleasure to the Jouissance 
of the Madonna: The Mother’s Maternal Gaze in Three Photographic Examples”).
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their disappearance when hegemony requires their transformation into 
coherent formations. She has often called the marginal the “feminine,” 
and beyond their differences, several theories converge to agree with her, 
whether they call it “feminine,” “queer,” “trans,” or something else:
In the end, recognizing feminine “specificity” and “creativity” associates 
them with the structures and identities borrowed from paternalistic and 
monotheistic societies. Because such societies do not recognize femi-
nine specificity, they try to put it aside, subdue it, and make sure no one 
talks about it. (qtd. in Guberman 106)
What I am trying to say is that Kristeva is suggesting the shortcomings 
she highlights would be caused by a  lack of philosophical reflection on 
the very meaning of “difference.” While equality and difference feminists 
achieved much at a political and sociological level, feminist achievement is 
more mitigated at an aesthetic level. Kristeva appears to place a certain type 
of intellectual practice, commonly denoted by the terms “French theory” 
or “continental philosophy,” higher and above other academic disciplines, 
like politics or sociology. But it would be a mistake to see in this the ar-
rogant exclusion of other intellectual traditions. In fact, she puts forward 
an in teresting dynamic between a feminism that is supposedly verifiable 
and more exact, and an aesthetic feminism that directly challenges it. Why 
should we take aesthetic seriously as a tool for subversion? Because Kris-
teva thinks that in a time of crisis where melancholia permeates the socius, 
aesthetic production is a (if not the) chance to rise above crisis and to mo-
bilize imaginative skills precisely because the possibility of aesthetic prac-
tice seems foreclosed (Gambaudo, Kristeva, Psychonalysis and Culture; 
Lechte and Margaroni 3). In the Western world, crisis is partly caused by 
changes in the limits of authority, partly it is a side effect of the importance 
we give technology. Let me take each in turn.
As mentioned at the start of this essay, Kristeva has been criticized for 
seemingly siding with the enemy and encouraging us to protect what she 
terms “the father” or “the Symbolic.” Against her detractors (I am thinking 
of Butler’s excellent critique in Gender Trouble), Kristeva firmly believes in 
the value of maintaining a certain form of hegemony in the defence of sin-
gular experience. But if the assurance of personal creativity rests on the per-
petuation of hegemony, it is not done willy-nilly and Kristeva believes two 
conditions need to be fulfilled: the maintenance of a fairly solid boundary 
between permission and interdiction and the suppleness of that boundary 
(Lechte 143–63). The failure to go beyond hegemony and show personal 
creativity is then a consequence of either too rigid a dominant discourse 
(for example totalitarianism) or of its instability (for instance corruption), 
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if not inexistence. So ironically, the suppression of difference, in my earlier 
example the introduction of “gay marriage,” leads to its assimilation to an 
existing model but not to the eradication of difference, here homophobia. 
Second is the question of technology. Kristeva believes “an excess of 
technology can kill the imagination’ (qtd. in Lechte 152). There is a certain 
amount of nostalgia in her views, a nostalgia for the good old “pen-to-
paper” days when communication was mediated by tangible matter like 
ink or a blank sheet. Kristeva’s gripe with technology also goes beyond 
this. She describes aspects of technology and the use we make of it that 
feel uncomfortably Orwellian. For example, the reaching out for ready-
made answers (the “just Google it” approach to difficulties from cooking 
recipes to existential angst) or the use of prefabricated images as models 
of experience (distressed customers of the Costa Concordia reported that 
they knew what was happening because their experience was reminiscent 
of scenes seen in the film Titanic) suggest that knowledge is not so much 
mediated by the body from the inside out, but rather generated through 
our consumption of technology from the outside in. These would be the 
side effects (or, in the long term, the regulation) of life experiences in 
a technological environment. Kristeva deplores the impoverishment of the 
human psyche which, for lack of use, increasingly shows wastage in areas 
like the capacity to cope with emotions and the aptitude to be creative. The 
potential to unleash political control or marketing strategies upon needy 
but docile populations indeed makes for uncomfortable thought.
conclusIon
There is a difficulty in abiding by a Kristevan ethics because there is am-
bivalence with regard to what we might ethically object to. On the one 
hand, she shows quite successfully that certain cultural manifestations hin-
der political action against the marginalization of difference. A weakening 
symbolic referent replaced by, for example, a more technological narrative 
of the human, would be both markers of what is hindered and of what ob-
structs the path towards change. On the other hand, Kristeva also guards 
us against the option of authenticating perpetrators and victims of crimes 
committed in the name of difference. In what appears a circular argument, 
Kristeva has been one of the early key figures to insist on the importance 
of understanding how difference (and the marginalization of difference) is 
manifested and the urgency in unpicking the structures that operate un-
derneath the notion of difference. The authentication of crime would be 
the domain of the Law, of diversity policies and their application. But these 
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can only be short to medium term answers to social unrest, with mitigated 
social efficacy and always in need of reformulation. The latter would be the 
responsibility of intellectuals and artists. I suggested at the start that Kris-
teva’s discreet form of intellectualism had a crucial role to play in solving 
social concerns, but this is not entirely accurate. In fact, Kristeva does 
not envisage a solution and this ambivalence, no doubt, put hopeful critics 
off. Instead, her vision has political activists and intellectuals engaged in 
a common venture where each represents one aspect of the same process. 
If Kristeva’s ethics were to be defined, it would be found here, in the fight 
to maintain dialogue between civic realities and aesthetics, where political 
action tracks reflection and vice versa.
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